This article was first published in PS: Political Science and Politics, December 2000.
saved from url=(0041)http://www.apsanet.org/PS/dec00/simon.cfm Public Administration in Today's World of Organizations and Markets Herbert A. Simon, Carnegie Mellon University It is a special pleasure for me to give a lecture named in honor of John M. Gaus. My files still retain several gracious letters from him to a young colleague, one after a session in which we had participated at the 1950 APSA meeting; another commenting on a paper I had published in APSR in 1953.
When I encountered the world of public administration 65 years
ago, John Gaus was just undertaking, with Leon O. Wolcott, their
remarkable study, Public Administration and the United States
Department of Agriculture (1940). Don Smithburg, Vic Thompson, and I
drew heavily on that work when we wrote our textbook, Public
Administration, in 1950. Gaus and Wolcott's work today continues to
throw valuable light on how organizations come into existence and
grow, often under the influence of technological advances that
provide them with the potential for important new activities. The
innovations in the Department of Agriculture that their book
examined included forest conservation, vaccines to combat animal
diseases, and the parity principle to deal with agricultural
overproduction during the Great Depression.
In fact, Gaus and Wolcott's analysis of the interaction of
organizational and technological change resonates strongly with
today's interest in the processes and rates of growth of public and
business organizations.
Research on Complex Organizations
This brings me directly to my topic for this evening: the
mechanisms that make complex organizations effective instruments for
carrying out human purposes. And even closer to the theme of John
Gaus's study of the interactions between technological innovation
and changes in governmental organization, I should like to ask what
kinds of organizational structures facilitate change and innovation.
I will talk about both private economic institutions and government.
Recently, the Russell Sage Foundation sponsored several
conferences involving some Nobel Prize winners in economics who have
strayed into political science, often either to show how economic
analysis could explain political phenomena (i.e., "Public Choice")
or to discuss the merits of markets and private enterprises as ways
of getting our society's work done (Alt, Levi, and Ostrom 1999). I
was invited to participate in the conferences as a Nobel economist,
but I treasonably defected to my political science origins in order
to defend our political institutions against the imperialism of
utility maximization, competitive markets, and privatization.
Neoclassical economics created a unified framework for
"explaining" virtually all human behavior as produced by an Olympian
process of utility maximization that recognizes no limits to the
knowledge or thinking powers of the human actors. The neoclassical
framework assumed a static equilibrium and, as soon as serious
attention began to be paid to dynamic phenomena and uncertainty in
large, complex social systems, the structure began to deteriorate,
and continues to crumble today.
Today, economics is in an increasingly chaotic and productive
state of disorganization, searching for an alternative picture of
economic mechanisms and human rationality--that is, of the genuine
bounded rationality of which people are capable. There are
theoretical proposals galore; what is still in short supply is
detailed empirical research (of kinds that are well-known in
political science) to determine how human beings actually go about
solving problems and making decisions.
I do not intend to reopen the whole range of questions posed by
bounded rationality, but will direct my remarks to just one
institutional aspect: Why, in a modern society, do we have markets,
and why do we have organizations, and what determines the boundary
between these two mechanisms for social organization? These
questions go to the heart of the roles of our diverse political and
administrative institutions, public and private, in contemporary
society.
Markets as Coordinating Mechanisms
If we were to take an extreme libertarian view, both markets and
organizations would be unnecessary. For the libertarian, human
beings are Leibnitzian monads: hard, elastic little particles that
bounce off each other without any other interaction, certainly
without either responding to or influencing each others' values.
Libertarians can hold to their faith only on the absurd assumption
that my exercise of freedom never affects your ability to exercise
yours. Quite the opposite: The freedoms and the fates of all six
billion of us who occupy this globe are inextricably interwoven.
Markets and organizations allow human beings to do together,
through interchange of information and the ensuing coordination of
activity, things they could not do independently. Coordination
simply means organizing activity in such a way as to handle the
problems that arise because the behavior of each participant depends
in some ways on the behaviors of the others. I hardly need explain
why such dependence is often valuable; if you absent-mindedly drive
in the right instead of the left lane while visiting Britain, you
will find out all too soon. Organizations, some quite large,
especially armies, have been with us since the earliest historic
times and earlier. Perhaps for that reason, we take them for
granted, and they excite in us less wonder than do markets, which
developed somewhat later, first locally, then over increasingly long
distances. The most peculiar characteristic of markets, Adam Smith's
"invisible hand," is their ability to secure coordination without
obvious central planning, and without a common interest among their
members, for each buyer and seller is supposed to be pursuing
independently his or her own private interest.
But this invisibility of mutual dependence is deceptive. The
usefulness of markets depends on a shared knowledge of the prices
and the characteristics of goods that are being traded, the absence
of serious third-person effects (so-called "externalities") that are
not reflected in prices, and sufficient stability of products and
manufacturing practices so that both sellers and buyers can plan
their activities rationally and make rational decisions to sell and
buy at the prices at which the markets equilibrate. They also depend
critically on the safety of transit routes. The effects upon buyers
and sellers of agricultural products of prolonged drought, or the
effects of closing a strategic strait in a major trade route between
India and Europe provide vivid examples of the fragility of markets
in the face of various forms of uncertainty, and the social and
human distress that can be caused by their malfunctioning.
In order to use markets to provide oil for the lamps of China,
oil well owners must know that there exists a land, China, where oil
will be used in certain volumes at certain prices for at least the
proximate future (the relevant time horizon depending on the time
required to produce the oil and amortize the investments). And the
Chinese buyers will acquire oil lamps only if they believe that oil
will be purchasable at a price that makes oil lamps competitive with
alternative light sources. Substantial stability of manufacturing,
consumption, and trade is essential to markets' working effectively.
And, of course, social institutions, and governmental organizations
in particular, play an essential role in maintaining (and
occasionally destroying) that stability.
On another dimension, where there are many competing commodities,
similar but not identical, price information may have to be
supplemented by product quality information offered by organizations
like Consumer Reports so that buyers can compare competing brands,
or by governmental regulations to protect them from injurious
products. If we wish to understand how complex markets can be, we
can turn to building-construction contracts, or contracts for
manufacturing large custom-built machinery, and count how many
pieces of information have to pass between designers and builders
before a contract can be sealed, and how much daily interaction
takes place between seller and buyer while the transaction is being
completed. Such contracts might almost better be viewed as
agreements to form temporary organizations for the duration of
particular construction or manufacturing jobs.
In summary, markets are, indeed, remarkable coordinating
mechanisms in the parsimony of their requirements for information.
But they are far less parsimonious than they appear at first blush,
for they require a high degree of economic stability and a low level
of externalities in order to operate. Moreover, in important classes
of market transactions, much product information must flow in the
negotiation of the exchange and the subsequent manufacturing
process. Adam Smith's invisible hand is often highly visible.
Consequently, when the qualifying conditions for stability of
markets are not met, as, for example, in wartime, we see a rapid
movement toward centralized planning as the preferred coordinating
mechanism for many activities.
From a Market Economy to an Organizational
Economy
We are so accustomed to hearing our society described as a market
economy that we are often surprised to observe that, since the time
of Adam Smith, markets have steadily declined, and business (and
governmental) organizations have steadily grown as the principal
coordinators of economic activity. In Adam Smith's time, almost the
only economic organizations beyond the scale of individual families
were agricultural estates directly managed by their owners or
through stewards, and relatively small shops owned by guild masters.
The putting-out system was a market system, not an organizational
system, though one with a special coordinating role for the
capitalist who contracted for the successive stages of manufacture
of the products--from flax to yarn to cloth to a peasant's blouse.
The contractor did not operate as an employer managing a factory.
Adam Smith took a dim view of large organizations where management
became separated from the direct oversight of the owner. Looking
around for examples of such organizations, he found mainly
universities like Oxford and Cambridge, which he described as inept,
inefficient, and corrupt. (One could claim that Smith anticipated
our golden parachutes for salaried executives. Perhaps he was
forewarned by the not-infrequent
speculations by stewards of the estates of the gentry and
aristocracy.) But in spite of Smith's skepticism, organizations have
grown until the vast bulk of our economy's activity takes place
within the walls of individual large business corporations, not in
markets. This growth had already begun to root itself, in the coal
mining, iron, ceramics, and textile industries, at the time that
Smith was writing his great work, and entered into land and sea
transportation a generation or two later. (He foreshadowed it just a
bit in his tale of the efficiency of specialization in the
manufacture of pins.) It was triggered in large measure by
technological advance, especially the invention of the steam engine
and its applications as a centralized power
source for a factory or mine and, later, for a ship or train. footnote 1
Today, in consequence of these developments, we do not live in a
market economy, but in an organization economy, or at most, in an
organization/market economy, with a predominance of organizational
over market activity. It is ironic that one of the first industries
to move toward this new kind of organizational society was
transportation, where the railroads enabled an enormous rise of
market exchanges over long distances, with correspondingly large
factories to produce the goods that were exchanged. Electronics is
now completing the comparable transformation of communication.
Now, before going on to my next topic, I must issue one caveat.
Current developments in electronics, notably the development of the
World Wide Web and e-markets, and the enhanced abilities of
organizations to manage geographically dispersed activities, provide
new opportunities of unknown magnitude for coordination at a
distance. Today, we have very little experience with these new
developments, both their current forms and their potential. Hence,
there is as yet little basis for judging whether markets or
organizations will be best able to make use of the new opportunities
and whether, as a consequence, we will see a continuation or
acceleration of the current trend towards concentration of
productive activity within organizations, or will see that trend
slowed or even reversed in favor of markets.
How
Organizations Coordinate
To understand this growth in organizations, business and
governmental, we must understand organizations' ability to
coordinate complex activities efficiently, and at far higher levels
than markets can attain. As organization theory has long taught us,
coordination is not a good but a necessity. Coordination is costly
and imperfect, and we wish to introduce no more of it than the
structure and intricacy of our goals calls for. Stated a little more
positively, organization design focuses on balancing the gains from
coordination against its costs. The first step in designing an
effective organization is to determine what kinds of
interdependencies in its activities will benefit from coordination,
and then to minimize the amount of coordination required by
partitioning activities in such a way that a much lower rate of
interaction, on a more leisurely time scale, is required between
subunits at any level than is required within each subunit. This is
the familiar division of work. The same issues of balance between
the benefits and costs of coordination that guide organizational
design also play a major role in defining the boundaries between
organizations and markets, which are defined by the decisions of
when to make things or perform services within the organization and
when to buy them from outside vendors.
In any case, the basic reality of the division of work is that
high rates of rapid communication are required among people who
perform activities that are highly interdependent, much less
frequent communication is required among those carrying out
activities that are independent, and this distinction should be
clearly reflected in organization structure. Systems whose structure
reflects these properties are referred to as "nearly decomposable."
And a formal mathematical theory exists today that describes them
and makes important predictions, as we shall see, about their
behavior.
Organizational Identification
A second component of organizational design is the special
contracts between the organization and its participants: for
example, employment contracts with those who work in it, stock and
bond ownership contracts with those who contribute capital, and
sales contracts with suppliers and customers. A key feature of
organizations is the employment contract, which "buys" the
employee's efforts during working hours so that they can be applied
to the organization's goals. Of course, ordinary economic motives
play an important role in securing employee acceptance of
employment, but far more is involved. Once installed in the
organization, the employee is surrounded by information and
influences quite different from those that would surround him or her
in another setting, inducing in the employee a strong
identification, not only motivational but also cognitive, with the
organization and its goals. It is this mechanism of organizational
identification that Adam Smith missed when he concluded that large
organizations with hired managers could not be efficient.
Organizational identification is a powerful motivator, rooted
both in people's values and in their need to build a simplified
model of the world that focuses upon their particular
responsibilities and work environment. It is distinct from the
self-interest which, of course, also plays an important part in
organizational behavior.
It is the organizational identification of members, more than any
other of their characteristics, that gives organizations their
remarkable power to secure coordinated behavior of large numbers of
people to accomplish organizational goals, thereby playing a major
role during the past two centuries in the rise of modern
organizations and in their successful competition with traditional
market mechanisms. footnote 2 Identification has received too little attention
in our research on organizations.
Organizational identification does not depend on profit motives;
it can work within governmental and university organizations as
powerfully as within profit-making businesses. Such studies as have
been made (not as numerous as one would like) show that, on average,
profit-making and governmental organizations that produce the same
products, both operating in markets, attain about the same levels of
efficiency--the profit motive appears to give no visible competitive
edge to private business. So the increasing tendency in recent
decades for government agencies to contract out many of their
activities evidently is not driven by considerations of
efficiency--or, if it is, there is little solid empirical evidence
for this preference.
What are the implications of this picture for the role of
organizations, and especially governmental organizations, in our
society?
Organizational Innovation and Adaptation to
Change
The interest in recent years of many sciences in complexity and
complex systems has drawn attention to the fact that most of the
complex systems seen in the world are nearly decomposable systems.
They are arranged in levels, the elements at each lower level being
subdivisions of the elements at the level above. Molecules are
composed of atoms, atoms of electrons and nuclei, electrons and
nuclei of elementary particles. Multicelled organisms are composed
of organs, organs of tissues, tissues of cells.
Why is this principle of organization so universal? The answer to
this question has two parts. The first I have already discussed:
Near-decomposability is a means of securing the benefits of
coordination while holding down its costs by an appropriate division
of labor among subunits. So, if we design complex systems to operate
efficiently, we must incorporate near-decomposability in the design.
But most of the complex systems we see in nature were not
designed; they evolved through the processes of natural selection.
In evolution, there is a different, but closely related, reason why
near-decomposability prevails. In an environment of evolutionary
change and natural selection, nearly decomposable systems will adapt
to the changing environment and gain in fitness more rapidly than
systems without this property. I can indicate roughly why this is
so.
If increases in fitness of one organ of an organism do not affect
the fitness of other organs (except possibly for adjustment of
relative size) and if increases in organ fitness are reflected in
the organism's overall efficiency, natural selection will home in
rapidly on the favorable changes that occur. Thinking of the
evolution of organs as a problem in design, designing each organ to
adapt to changing requirements will be much easier if the design of
any one organ has little effect on the efficiency of the others; if
the heart can be designed without redesigning the lungs, for
instance. With a higher degree of dependence, the continued
"favorability" of any change in one organ will depend on what
changes occur in the other organs at the same time or in the future.
There is, then, no simple basis for selecting those changes that
will continue to benefit the whole system, creating a dependency
among the structures of the separate organs that is highly inimical
to change.
If complex systems must operate in a constantly changing
environment, or in competition with other systems that are changing,
they must modify their structures at a corresponding pace. The need
for close coordination, even in the presence of strong
identification with the organization's goals, places a very heavy
burden on a system's capacity to evolve toward greater effectiveness
under changed conditions. For although identification reduces the
need to police self-interest and to ensure its compatibility with
organizational objectives, it also causes excessive influence of
existing organizational practices and identifications upon decisions
that should be adapting to a changing world. This is the major cause
for the difficulty that organizations, even very successful ones,
experience in trying to respond to rapidly changing opportunities
and challenges, and why they are often outpaced by new organizations
that do not carry the same burden of outmoded knowledge and habit.
Near-decomposability affects the growth potential of market
systems as it does the potential of organizations. Although markets
are weakly coordinated systems, permitting a considerable degree of
independent change in each component, the change must not be so
rapid as to destabilize the expectations of participants that, in
stable markets, make large short-term flows of information
unnecessary. When markets must compete with organizations as means
for securing the benefits of progressive change by rapid adaptation,
the former are likely to succeed in this competition only in highly
stable environments.
In light of these considerations, we might read the history of
the past 200 years of industrializing societies as showing that,
with the growing advantage that large organizations secured from
advanced technology, and our increased skills in designing large
organizations that achieve high levels of coordination which
maintain a reasonable approximation to near decomposability of their
components, we have enlarged greatly the area within which
organizations are more effective than markets. This conclusion
applies to governmental as well as to business organizations, for
both have followed similar paths in the development of their
designs.
Social Implications
Let me turn now from these rather abstract and high-level
pictures of social systems and the course of their development and
ask why it matters. I will focus on two issues: first, the
distribution of power in modern society, and, second, the
distribution of the social product. I'm afraid that the picture my
crystal ball displays is still abstract, but it does refer to
matters that are of very practical concern to all of us,
individually and collectively.
The Distribution
of Power
Lord Acton said it very well, and I don't think I can say it
better: "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts
absolutely."
A central problem in democratic institutions at all times and in
all places has been and is to create a broad distribution of power,
and to keep that distribution in stable equilibrium. A basic tenet
of democratic theory, well supported by historical and other
evidence, is that self interest is such a strong motive that no
fraction of members of a society can be safely entrusted with the
freedom and welfare of others who do not participate in the
decision-making processes.
During the twentieth century, two massive experiments were
carried out, as well as numerous smaller ones, to determine whether
major changes in political and economic institutions could produce
the "new person" and the new institutions required to realize basic
human goals within a highly centralized system of power. It is now
widely agreed that the new institutions didn't work well and,
especially, that the "new person" didn't appear. The personal
motives that emerged in Soviet Russia and in Maoist China appeared
to be no less selfish or more virtuous than the motives of people in
other parts of the world--in fact, they were discouragingly
familiar.
Among neoclassical economists, the outcome of these experiments
was widely interpreted as a clear vindication of markets being the
bulwark of freedom and productivity. The years since the dissolution
of the Soviet Union and the complex developments in an
industrializing China have shown that matters are not so simple. As
to Russia, it has become painfully clear that the introduction of
markets without the coincident introduction of socially enforced
rules of the game for their operation and the simultaneous creation
of viable and effectively managed organizations cannot create a
productive economic system. Nor has a stable equilibrium of diffused
power been established in Russia. In China, there remain substantial
deficiencies in the social enforcement of market rules and, at the
same time, continuing governmental interference with normal market
operations, as well as equally evident deficiencies in
organizational skills and steadfast resistance to the
decentralization of power.
Nothing that we have seen in these two histories challenges the
thesis that diffusion of power requires, in addition to markets, a
multiplicity of effective organizations to perform a society's
productive and service tasks. In fact, it can well be argued that
the most important role markets play in a modern society is to
diffuse power by holding organizations, through competition, to the
tasks of providing efficiently the things demanded in the markets,
thus preventing them from using their resources as power bases for
extending their social influence and control by direct influence
upon government. A multiplicity of organizations competing
vigorously in markets is a strong protection against diversion of
resources (by either for-profit or not-for-profit organizations) to
political objectives.
By the same token, diffusion of power calls for governmental
organizations that maintain a reasonable balance between the
effectiveness that large business organizations can sometimes
provide and an avoidance of concentration of power in a few places.
The many experiments with privatization of services that had
previously, for good or indifferent reasons, been supplied by public
agencies, are beginning now to show us that switching to the
market/business-organization system is not a sovereign remedy for
all administrative ills.
To illustrate what I have in mind, I need merely mention the
complex mixture of gains and losses that deregulation of the air
transportation industry has brought to its customers (in spite of
rosy reports of fare savings). The same can be said of deregulation
and privatization of energy distribution, education, and
communications, all of which are faced today with perplexing
economic and organizational problems. I could add other examples,
notably the prison industry, which has not become a magical cure for
criminal tendencies as a result of experiments in privatization.
Nor can we say that we have solved all of the organizational
problems posed by public goods and by such externalities as those
associated with preservation of the environment. Experience has
indicated that a wide range of essential services can be provided
better by government than by any private business arrangement thus
far invented, or, as in the case of basic research, will be
undersupplied because of public goods aspects, if left to
competitive markets.
We do not need to reinvent government. Governmental organizations
are needed, as they have always been needed, to enforce the rules of
the game (including the rules of market contracting), to facilitate
coordination of private organizations, and to perform services that
are unlikely to be performed effectively by the private sector. The
legal institutions must be vigorous and independent enough to curb
corruptions of the rules of the game by bribery and other illegal
activities. And the rules of the game themselves (e.g., rules for
political campaign contributions) must themselves not enable
influence buying. footnote 3 In performing these functions, government
agencies themselves, of course, become centers of power that help
balance the power exerted by the private sector in its own
interests.
Distribution of the Social Product: Levels of Employment and
Production
There is little consensus in economics today about how to
maintain high levels of employment and production, even though, at
the moment, we are enjoying these conditions; many economists, when
asked why, look toward Heaven and sigh. Among those of my friends
and acquaintances who are macroeconomists or specialists on money, I
find only one point of general agreement (and even here there is
dissent from diehard believers in the gold standard). Most agree
that money is neither a solid substance, nor a liquid, nor a gas; it
is simply a state of mind. More precisely, money's value is a
collection of states of mind of all the people who use it. These
states of mind, as history shows, can change in a short time from
utmost confidence in a currency to utmost skepticism, and vice
versa. On the role of government spending and monetary policy in
determining the level of activity, "expert" opinions range from the
laissez-faire of rational expectations to Keynesianism and beyond.
Having identified this important topic and the disarray of expert
views about it, there is only one thing about it that I can say with
confidence: Maintaining economic equilibrium cannot be left to the
invisible hand of the market, it requires governmental attention.
What economists call Say's Law guarantees that the economy can be in
equilibrium at any level of activity from 100% employment of workers
and capital to zero percent. At both of these levels, and all
between, the income from selling goods will just balance the costs
of producing them plus the profits of owners. So production produces
total incomes that are just sufficient to purchase the marketed
product. When markets are not at full employment equilibrium, as
they often aren't, neoclassical theory does not explain why, nor
what to do about it.
Distribution of the Social Product:
Fairness
Just as competitive markets cannot, by themselves, guarantee an
adequate distribution of power in a society or full employment, so
they do not guarantee that markets will distribute income and wealth
in a way that will satisfy our notions of fairness. "Fairness" is,
of course, not a question of fact, but of values. What is fair
cannot be settled by our science. Hence, I will limit myself to
showing the consequences of a particular definition of fairness that
has wide currency in our society today: that it is fair that people
receive and be allowed to retain what they earn. I am not advocating
your adoption of this definition, I'm simply using it to illustrate
the complexities of the design of social systems that take the
question of fairness into account.
Let me pose a simple question. Consider the income that you or
your family now earn as members of American society (which most of
you are) and compare it with the income that you would expect to
earn if you were equally hardworking members of Chinese or Indian
society, or the society of any other Third World nation. I expect
that for most of you, the difference between the two incomes is one
or more orders of magnitude, at least 10 to 1 and perhaps even more
than 100 to 1.
Now, I would like you to consider the causes for the gap between
the 10 and the 1 or the 100 and the 1. How much of it do you wish to
attribute to your superior energy, motivation, and application of
effort as compared with your Third World counterparts? And how much
do you wish to attribute to your good luck or good judgment in being
born in, or joining, the highly productive and democratic American
society?
If we are very generous with ourselves, I suppose we might claim
that we "earned" as much as one fifth of it. The rest is the
patrimony associated with being a member of an enormously productive
social system, which has accumulated a vast store of physical
capital, and an even larger store of intellectual capital--including
knowledge, skills, and organizational know-how held by all of us--so
that interaction with our equally talented fellow citizens rubs off
on us both much of this knowledge and this generous allotment of
unearned income. Again, I have no specific proposal for allocating
the "unearned" income of an affluent society. That, of course, is
one of the important things we will be voting on in November.
Clearly, the allocation of income in a society is a matter of values
to be decided by political processes.
What I wish to emphasize is simply that public attitudes about
the fair allocation of income are necessarily and justifiably a
major factor in determining the scope and nature of public
organizations in the society. There is no way in which the proper
allocation of the social product can be left solely to the market in
a private-organization/market/public-organization society, or solely
to considerations of productive efficiency. Society is demonstrably
not a collection of Leibnitzian monads. Much more flows between the
members of a society, in the form of exchange of information and
cooperation, than the simple interchange of momentum by impact.
Market equilibria that are Pareto efficient will often be inferior
to other equilibria, Pareto efficient or not, when criteria of
fairness are applied.
Conclusion
It is not too fanciful to think of writing a history of human
civilization in terms of progress in the means of human cooperation,
that is, of organization. In that history, hierarchical and nearly
decomposable systems would play a central role. Almost from the
beginning, the division of work into component tasks and the
assembly of the components into a hierarchy were discovered to be
powerful means for achieving efficient coordination of effort. In a
later period, markets entered as a means of coordinating certain
kinds of transactions that required very limited communication, and
therefore can take place over long distances. Then, long before the
Christian era, nation states and empires emerged that show there is
almost no upper limit to the sizes to which organizations can
aspire.
The system, after more than a millennium and a half, entered a
new stage when the social store of knowledge and innovation in
technologies begin to accelerate, with markets again at first
playing a central role in enabling these developments. Gradually,
increases in the demands for, and in the advantages of, more
coordination in economic activity, together with the accumulation of
skills of organizing, brought into existence ever-larger
corporations that begin to emulate in size the administrative
organizations of the nation-states--and we were launched into our
modern world.
Both private and public organizations have played essential roles
in these modern developments, complementing each others' functions,
learning from each other, and, at the same time, competing for power
to steer and manage the systems that have emerged. That process has
not reached its end, and political science and economics must
continue their mutual education, with each discipline learning from
the other.
The education must be symmetric. Its goal is not to convert
political science into a theory of the "public choices" of a
mythical, utility-maximizing "economic person." Its goal is to
understand how human behavior molds and is molded by the complex
structures it employs to secure the coordination needed to
accomplish most of its goals, and how this can be accomplished while
preserving the wide dispersion of power that is consistent with
democratic institutions.
1. For an excellent classical account of the sequence of events, see Hammond and Hammond (1926). back to point in text
2. It also, regrettably, causes human beings identified with particular groups to commit terrible atrocities against human beings in other groups that are viewed as competitive or threatening, but that is another story. back to point in text
3. I have no particularly novel ideas to propose for accomplishing these goals, still very imperfectly realized in our society. Whenever simple solutions are proposed for problems of social organization, we must be careful to test them against these goals. back to point in text
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